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Abstract
What drives extreme and rare economic events? Motivated by recent theory, and
events in US subprime markets, we begin to open the black box of extremes. Specif-
ically, we build a taxonomy of extremes, then extend standard economic analysis of
extreme risk. First, we model the potentially relevant dimensions of dynamics and
endogeneity. In characterizing individuals’ endogenous propagation of extremes, we
relate the latter to public goods. Second, using over a century of daily stock price data,
we construct empirical probabilities of extremes. We document that extremes are rela-
tively frequent and persistent. We find evidence that extremes are endogenous, raising
the possibility that control of extremes is a public good.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
For whoever knows the ways of Nature will more easily notice her deviations;
and ... whoever knows her deviations will more accurately describe her ways.
F. Bacon: New Organum.
In the spring and summer of 2007, the aftershock from the subprime market, a relatively
small part of US financial markets, has reached over to touch hedge funds and international
markets. In the US, credit spreads have widened ominously, even for safer debt, and the
housing market reached record breaking levels. For example, as shown in Figure 1, the
percentage change in the Case-Shiller index reached both its historical (20-year) maximum
of nearly 16% in 2005 and its historical minimum of -4.52% in the third quarter of 2007.
In Britain the interbank rate has reached its highest level in 9 years, as shown in Figure 2.
Modern economies are repeatedly subject to such financial extremes, sometimes contem-
poraneously or in rapid succession, as in the contagion episodes in East Asia during the
late 1990s. Extreme events often seem unpredictable, but are they? This paper begins to
open the black box, and proposes a positive theory of extremes, based on externalities. By
way of motivation, let us discuss two current puzzles.
A mortgage market puzzle: Recent events in the US subprime mortgage market are
difficult to explain using standard economic analysis. The years leading up to 2007 featured
a large demand for housing loans by US households of various credit levels. At the same
time, lenders offered a large supply of low rate loans to prospective homeowners with ex-
tremely poor credit history, and high likelihood of default. According to standard informa-
tion theory, the housing loan market features moral hazard and adverse selection, because
borrowers know more about their ability to repay than do lenders. A standard solution to
such information asymmetry involves credit rationing by lenders, or signalling quality by
prospective borrowers (see Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Riley (2001)). However, during
the period from 2000 to 2007, the opposite happened. As mentioned above, availability
of credit to low credit history individuals increased, and potential borrowers did not have
to signal.1 Despite improvements in risk management by banks and regulatory authorities,
such issues have recurred in recent years, in many developed economies. For example,
a similar situation existed in Japan’s Jusen loans, and in Norway during the 1990s. This
1For example, borrowers without collateral were encouraged to apply for loans, and therefore did not have
to signal quality.
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puzzle suggests that there might be other factors at work in addition to information issues,
especially during extreme events.
A hedge fund spillover puzzle: A second puzzle relates to the recent hedge fund deba-
cles. Two issues convey the essence of this puzzle. The first issue concerns spillovers from
the subprime market to hedge funds and other domestic or international investors. There
have been a number of instances, so we only consider one of the more outstanding. In July
and August of 2007 hedge funds suffered such severe losses that Goldman Sachs had to
infuse US$3 billion into one of its funds, Global Equity Opportunities. This fund lost 30
per cent of its value in the week between August 3 and August 10. This seems to be the first
time that Goldman Sachs has assisted a hedge fund, especially in that magnitude. A major
reason cited for the severe hedge fund losses was that the extremes that occurred in markets
were ’25 standard deviation’ events (New York Times, August 13, 2007). These incidents
are puzzling because hedge funds did not seem directly exposed to heavy enough risk to
warrant such drops in value.2 The second issue concerns extreme surprises. Most hedge
funds and investment banks have risk management systems that are stress tested against
extreme market events such as terrorism risk, banking crises, and interest rate changes. So
what sort of event could surprise such respected hedge funds enough to lose as much as
one-third of their value? A potential answer is that our approach to understanding ”sur-
prise” extreme events is incomplete. One source of incompleteness is that both information
economics and current risk management are generally silent about time variation in the
probability of extremes. Another issue is that they do not always account for endogenous
spillover effects from one economic sector to others (such as mortgage market effects on
hedge funds), especially in the face of extreme events.
A possible solution to both puzzles is to extend existing theory to include explicit, pos-
itive analysis of extremes. Existing theory acknowledges that individual agents’ incentives
or behavior can affect individual outcomes, for example, in insurance markets. This frame-
work is usually restricted to individual agents or sectors, and typically requires asymmetric
information between borrowers and lenders. The current issues, however, potentially affect
numerous sectors and regions. Moreover, especially in the case of subprime mortgages,
it is difficult to argue that lenders were oblivious to asymmetric information issues, and
did not understand the potential for default when supplying loans to borrowers with poor
credit history or no collateral. Therefore, current experience suggests that an extension of
2Moreover, the spillover effect on international markets was large enough to prompt unscheduled central
bank interest rate cuts in the US and Europe.
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existing approaches may be valuable, especially for analyzing extreme outcomes. In this
paper we attempt to provide such an extension. In particular, we will illustrate that under
some conditions, aggregate spillover effects can happen even in the absence of asymmetric
information. A graphical depiction of our approach is in Table 1. This table shows that our
view of endogenous probability is similar to that of moral hazard. The only difference is
that we consider broader settings, where there may be spillovers and general information
structures.
Discussions of extreme economic events often assume that extremes are generated ex-
ogenously by nature, and have a constant probability of occurrence.3 But is the likelihood
of extreme and rare events affected, at times, by our behavior? And do we sometimes ob-
serve spikes in the frequency of extremes? The answer to both questions is yes. Dynamic,
endogenous extremes occur in economics and in nature, including the effect of human ac-
tivity on both the likelihood of extreme financial events, and extreme climate changes.4
Importantly, when human activity endogenously increases the likelihood of extremes, they
may become less rare. In this paper, we explore a possible explanation for endogenous
extremes, namely, externality effects. Externalities occur when one agent’s actions directly
affect the environment of other agents. Financial crises and extremes have externality fea-
tures, since they affect many individuals in the national or global financial system, even
though often precipitated by a small number of individuals. It is well known that exter-
nalities cause inefficiency of the price system.5 Consequently, if extreme events are due to
externalities, society may not pay the appropriate price for the extremes that it generates.
How does this formulation of extreme externalities help us? It does so in two ways.
First, it allows us understand the origin of some extremes (the endogenous ones), thereby
giving us insight into which we can plausibly try to avert. Second, it gives banks and regu-
latory authorities an additional set of tools from public finance–subsidies, property rights,
and so on–that may help to address extreme events before and during their occurrence.
3See, for example, Barro (2006) and Friedman and Laibson (1989).
4See the cover story of Time, March 30, 2007; and Stern (2007); and Grossman (1988). The Economist’s
June 29 issue discusses climate change, where extremes become more normal over time.
5For textbook expositions of externalities, see Harris (2003), Chapter 9, Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
(1995) and Varian (1992). For related economic work on aggregate effects of externalities, see Blanchard and
Kiyotaki (1987).
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1.1 Related Research
Our research is related to existing work on extreme events and liquidity. Regarding ex-
treme and rare events, there are several recent, related papers. Barro (2006) constructs a
Lucas (1978) model with rare extreme events. Upon calibrating the model to twentieth
century data on extreme events, Barro (2006) finds that it allows him to address the equity
premium and riskfree rate puzzles. Weitzman (2007) develops a Bayesian model of asset
returns. He discovers that when agents consider the possibility of extremes, there is a re-
versal of all the major asset pricing puzzles. Chichilnisky and Wu (2006) present a model
of endogenous uncertainty where increased financial innovation leads to greater likelihood
of default. Chichilnisky (2007) shows that if by axiomatically extending expected util-
ity to account for extreme responses to extreme events, we can overcome decision theory
paradoxes, such as those due to Allais (1953) and Ellsberg (1961). Danielsson and Shin
(2003) discuss a scenario where unanticipated coordination of agents’ behavior leads to an
endogenous increase in risk. The research of Bazerman and Watkins (2004) suggests that
certain ”surprise” events in modern society are predictable, since there may exist sufficient
information to know that these events are imminent.6 Regarding liquidity, Acharya and
Schaefer (2005), on their page 7 discuss the notion that liquidity has regimes, which affect
the prices of stocks. These authors also suggest that market liquidity and asset correlations
are interrelated, due to large asset shocks. In a recent empirical study, Baele, Bekaert, and
Inghelbrecht (2007) examine the comovement of stocks and bonds using a VAR approach.
They first examine economic variables such as interest rates, inflation and risk aversion,
which do not fully explain stock-bond correlations. However, they find that liquidity helps
to explain the residual correlation that is unexplained by economic factors. Domowitz,
Hansch, and Wang (2005) provide a model where liquidity comovements are determined
by order types, and document that liquidity comovements are asymmetric, and much higher
during extreme down markets. Herring and Wachter (2005) suggest that liquidity shocks
and disaster myopia may play a role in deciding the pricking of real estate lending bubbles.
Our paper is similar to the above papers in that we discuss the importance of extreme
events and liquidity in socioeconomic life. However, our paper is different in several ways.
First, unlike previous research, we explicitly construct a taxonomy of extremes, then de-
6According to Bazerman and Watkins (2004), predictable surprises have six characteristics: leaders know
about a problematic issue, which will not go away; the issue worsens over time; the issue is costly to fix now,
and benefits would occur later; fixing the issue entails a certain cost, but uncertain reward; addressing the
issue changes the status quo; and a small vocal minority benefits from lack of preventive action.
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velop a simple model to explain the origins of endogenous extremes. Second, we derive the
”signature” of endogenous extremes, and relate it to liquidity spillovers. Third, we apply
the insights from our model to US stock market data, providing evidence on the temporal
nature and causes of market extremes. Finally, the model allows us to discuss new policy
solutions to extreme events, using a standard public finance toolkit. The rest of the paper
is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses general information on extreme
events and proposes a taxonomy. Section 3 presents a simple, stylized, positive approach
to analyzing dynamic, endogenous extremes. Section 4 outlines some policy implications
for current financial markets. Section 5 discusses our empirical application, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Nature and Causes of Extremes
Knowing the origin of extremes is evidently valuable for investors and policymakers. In
attempting to provide a glimpse of the origin, we now outline our positive approach to
analyzing extremes. There are two aspects to this approach.
2.1 Temporal Nature of Extremes
The first aspect concerns dynamic behavior of extremes. In typical economic applications
it is often implicitly assumed that the likelihood of extremes is constant over time. This
assumption is useful for analytical tractability. Evidently economic and natural systems
change and grow over time, which may affect the probability of extremes. There is some
evidence that extreme probabilities change over time, such as record-breaking stock market
levels in the 1990s, and increased numbers of Atlantic hurricanes since 2000. As shown
in Figure 3, both the number of natural disasters and their impact seem to have varied
over the past generation.7 For stress testing in hedge funds, for example, the likelihood of
large price deviations is very important to estimate. A mistaken assumption of constant
likelihood of extreme price changes is clearly dangerous at many levels, to central bankers
7The definition of disaster by EM-DAT is ”A situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, neces-
sitating a request to the national or international level for external assistance, or is recognized as such by a
multilateral agency or by at least two sources, such as national, regional or international assistance groups
and the media”. The definition of ”affected” encompasses individuals who were killed, injured, homeless or
requiring immediate assistance (food, clothing etc) after a disaster. For more details, see page 16 of Below,
Guha-Sapir, Hoyois, and Scheuren (2007).
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as well as individual and institutional investors. Thus, we might allow the temporal nature
of extremes to be static or dynamic. For static extremes, the likelihood of extreme events
pt is constant, and pt = p for all time periods. Dynamic extremes, by contrast, can be of
two varieties, either random or with a discernible dynamic pattern. We shall discuss this in
Section 3.
2.2 Causes of Extremes
The second aspect is an understanding of the distinction between exogenous and endoge-
nous extremes, each of which has a different policy response.8 Exogenous extremes arrive
from outside the economic system and are truly acts of nature, from the perspective of the
domestic economy. For example, in a crop-based economy, the probability p of extreme
changes in crop value could depend on exogenous swings in weather.9 Since weather is
generally unpredictable beyond a few days, and exogenous to an individual farmer, we can
represent the probability of extremes as essentially random. In order to obtain bounded
probabilities, we may consider a random variable zt and pt that are related in the following
manner:

 zt = zt−1 + εtpt = exp (zt)1+exp (zt) , (1)
where εt ∼ i.i.d N(0, γ), with γ > 0, for example.
Endogenous extremes, by contrast, are generated and perhaps amplified within the eco-
nomic system, by agents’ activity and interaction. This activity persists because extremes
have externality-like attributes, and therefore agents may ’over-produce’ the amount of ex-
tremes in the system. For example, stock market crashes and banking panics may stem
from excessive risk taking and borrowing of a segment of the economy (Fisher (1933)), ex-
cessive credit creation (Allen and Gale (2000)), and excessive reliance on computer-based
trading (Grossman (1988))).10 Since each agent has an incentive to borrow or risk too much
8In practice, there is likely to be a spectrum of extremes, with some being a mixture of exogenous and
endogenous. The idea here is to give us tools to assess the dominant influence on extremes.
9Other causes of exogenous extremes may include foreign wars, natural catastrophes, and uncertainty
about new technology.
10The above authors and other related researchers consider some form of extreme event or crisis, but vary
in their emphasis on endogeneity. Some model a closed economy or a single sector, others an international
setting. Therefore the applications differ, although endogeneity or externality issues are common to all. Our
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from the social point of view, competition leads to overproduction of extremes. Hence, the
probability of extremes may no longer be random as in (1). We will develop the relevant ex-
pression for this latter case in Section 3, after developing a concrete definition of extremes
below.
2.3 A Simple Taxonomy
Why do we need definitions of extreme and rare events? The main reason is that extremes
occur in many disciplines. Therefore, each has developed its own terminology, which may
be incompatible with that of other disciplines. For example, the concept of rare event is
used in at least four ways in decision-related sciences. First, in statistics and econometrics,
rare refers to a record-breaking phenomenon, one that has never occurred before (de Haan
and Sinha (1999)). Second, in political science, it denotes a low probability event with a
high impact, which may have occurred before (King and Zeng (2001)). Third, in the theory
of risky choice, it refers to a low probability event, which may have occurred before, but
not necessarily with a high impact (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2005)). Fourth, in
finance the closely related peso problem denotes an infrequent regime that is unobserved
but anticipated by economic agents (Evans (1996)).
We therefore need to develop a common language to discuss extreme and rare events,
since they arise in a wide variety of settings.11 Possessing a common language, we can
start to think about describing, forecasting and controlling extremes, a task that we begin
to pursue in the next section. Based on previous research as well as what we feel to be
intuitively appealing aspects of extremes, we now begin to develop a taxonomy. We will
first provide a set of heuristic definitions of typical, extreme and rare events, in turn. Given
the focus of this paper, we use definitions for quantitative data, such as security returns.
Typical events are those that are normal in some sense, or that we encounter frequently.
In previous economic literature, typical events have been conceptualized in two ways. First,
they are near the center of the distribution, for example, within 2 or 3 standard deviations.
This intuitive definition is useful in the case of the normal distribution, where 3 standard
paper seems to be the first to use this framework explicitly in a general setting, in order to begin developing
a positive theory.
11The study of extreme and rare events increasingly affects so many disciplines that it has the potential to be
considered a field in its own right. Examples of some associated disciplines include astrophysics, chemistry,
climatology, decision theory, finance, international relations, insurance, and statistics.
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deviations around the mean capture 99.7% of the distribution.12 Second, another way to
think of typical events is in topology. In this sense, an event is typical if it fills up the space
of events.13 Rare or extreme events can be heuristically visualized as the complement of
typical events, one in topology, the other in probability. Extreme events are ’far away’ from
the median, while rare events are ’small’ in the set of all events, respectively. Armed with
these heuristic descriptions, we suggest the following, simple taxonomy.
Consider a variable X with domain X ⊂ R. Define a relevant sample Xs ⊆ X, compris-
ing n realizations of this variable, Xs = X1, ...Xn, with median X¯s, and standard deviation
σs. If Xs is a time series, assume that the relevant sample data are covariance stationary. In
the following, superscripts T, R, and E indicate ’typical’, ’rare’ and ’extreme’, respectively.
Definition 1: A typical event XT ∈ Xs is in a range XTrange that contains more than
1/2 of the observations in the relevant data sample:
Number of Xi ∈ XTrange
Number of Xi ∈ Xs
≥
1
2
.
We now turn to rare events. The benchmark case for rare events is 1/5, to match the
psychologically motivated definition of Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2005). How-
ever, other researchers estimate different values for rare events.14 Therefore, in order to
give the researcher flexibility in deciding just how rare is rare, we index the definition by a
multiplicative parameter δ ≥ 1, that reduces the size of the rare set accordingly.
Definition 2: A δ−Rare eventXR(δ) is in a rangeXRrange that contains less than 1/5δ of
the observations in the relevant sample, in the presence of another (nonoverlapping) range
that occurs more frequently than itself:15
Number of Xi ∈ XRrange
Number of Xi ∈ XS
≤
1
5δ
.
12 For arbitrary non-normal distributions with finite variance σ2, we can provide deviation bounds in a
similar way, using Chebyshev’s inequality.
13This may be expressed by saying that the typical events form an open dense set in the set of all events,
as in Debreu (1970).
14For example, the empirical values all fall below 2% in the research of Barro (2006), Chollete, de la
Pena, and Lu (2006), Jansen and de Vries (1991), and King and Zeng (2001). Weber (2007) explains that
in experimental research on decisionmaking, the level 1/5 is the threshold at which the divergence between
decisions based on experience and description becomes pronounced.
15We require there to be a more frequent event, since the notion of rare is relative. Typical and rare events
are mutually exclusive but not exhaustive. An event can be neither typical nor rare, for example if its range
has an empirical likelihood between 1/5 and 1/2.
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Before defining extreme events, we observe that much research in finance, political
science and statistics uses the terms extreme and rare interchangeably. This custom is mis-
leading for at least two reasons. First is the possibility of extreme clusters, where extreme
events occur relatively frequently. For example, during bubbles or periods of high finan-
cial market volatility, it is possible for the stock index to reach levels far from the recent
median, routinely. Second, for highly skewed or heavy-tailed distributions, extremes can
occur more frequently than central observations. Consequently, it is important to define
extreme events in a way that does not assume, a priori, that they are either typical or rare. It
is also helpful to employ a definition that is related to the current practice of using standard
deviation or volatility. We therefore adopt the following definition.16
Definition 3: An ω-Extreme event XE(ω) is an event that is at least ω ≥ 1 standard
deviations away from X¯s, the relevant median:
|XE(ω) − X¯s| ≥ ωσs.
For financial time series, the benchmark median of the relevant dataset can easily be com-
puted dynamically, to capture the notion that over time, what once was extreme may be-
come commonplace.17 We are now ready to implement a workable definition of the empir-
ical probability of extremes, pt, for later use.
Definition 4: The Empirical probability p(ω) of an ω-extreme event XE(ω) measures
the relative frequency of observations exceeding ω standard deviations from the relevant
median X¯s:
p(ω) =
Number of [Xi ∈ Xs : |Xi − X¯s| ≥ ωσs]
Number of Xi ∈ Xs
.
16This definition is related to that of extreme value theory, where extremes are usually phrased in terms
of closeness to the maximum or minimum. The median is used instead of the mean or extrema because
it is robust and achieves the highest possible breakdown value, see Casella and Berger (1990) page 230.
Psychologically, people may take time to adjust their concept of normal, and the median embodies this more
than the mean. Note that we choose a slightly different definition from extreme value theory because in
finance we might worry about deviations from what is typical, even if they are not record-breaking events.
For large ω, the definition will be identical to that of extreme value theory, by choosing ω such that ωσs =
|X(1) − X¯s|, where X(1) is an extreme order statistic.
17For example, one could compute extremes relative to the previous quarter’s benchmark median, to cap-
ture individuals’ lag time in learning and computing the benchmark. The notation ω is chosen since it is often
used in definitions of oscillation.
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Evidently what is typical, extreme, or rare may change over time, and our definitions
above are designed to reflect this notion.18 We therefore emphasize that our definitions are
conditional: we condition on the relevant data sample, which is chosen with the guidance
of scientific theory and knowledge of the question at hand. This approach makes sense
from a social science perspective, acknowledging that when the world changes, we take
some time to recognize it. The conditional approach is a strength and a potential challenge.
The strength is that it frees researchers in various disciplines or with different questions
to choose their concept of rareness or extremeness, with alternative values of δ and ω. A
challenge is potential lack of comparability across different studies. If comparability is
an issue, one might compare extreme estimates using both the data sample suggested by
scientific theory and the entire data available.
3 Dynamic, Endogenous Extremes
3.1 Dynamic Extremes
As mentioned in Section 2, dynamic extremes can be random or display patterns. The ran-
dom case is represented by equation (1). Patterns may have many possible representations.
For parsimony, and in order to relate our formulation to existing work in time series anal-
ysis, we consider a simple stationary pattern. One such model is a simple autoregressive
representation, pt = α+
J∑
j=1
θjpt−j + εt. Although many lags are possible, we focus on the
first order case:
pt = α + θ1pt−1 + εt, (2)
where |θ1| < 1. Expression (2) permits us to capture the potential clustering in extremes
mentioned above.19
18Our definitions compare current events to past medians. The reason is that individuals’ notions of extreme
is often relative to what they have learned in previously. This can be motivated by psychology, where we take
time to learn about rare events by experience (Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2005)), or by disaster
myopia (Herring and Wachter (2005)). It can also be motivated by econometric considerations, since we
gather data at the end of the period before we can compute sample statistics.
19The focus of our discussion is on the empirical properties of pt. Therefore, the regression residual ε in
(2) must be compatible with bounded probabilities, because the pt data used in our estimation will lie in the
[0,1] interval. If we were interested in modeling the theoretical properties of the process, we could impose
boundedness in a standard way by using some variant of a logistic function, as we illustrated in equation (1).
We could also consider simple nonstationary models, for example a regime switching generalization.
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What is the signature of dynamic extremes? According to equations (1) and (2), dynamic
exogenous extremes have a frequency pt that depends either on a random arrival εt, or else
on some function of its own past values.
3.2 A Simple Model of Endogenous Extremes
Thus far, extreme probabilities are exogenous, and do not depend directly on variables un-
der the control of economic agents. We now formalize the arguments of Section 2.2, and
consider the possibility that economic agents and the economic environment influence the
frequency of extremes. While exogenous extremes are statistically unrelated to the eco-
nomic environment, endogenous extremes (since they are generated by economic agents)
should be related to the optimizing or equilibrium behavior of agents.
More formally, consider an economy comprising a large number l of lenders, and a large
number m of mortgage borrowers. Let m = f ·l, where f is some positive integer. Each
lender deals with an equal number of borrowers, f = m
l
. The m mortgages are drawn from
the same distribution, and of similar term. Lender and borrower activity affects other agents
in the financial system, including other banks, investment firms, hedge funds, and non-
borrowing investors, domestically and internationally. We denote these other agents O, for
other. In the following analysis we use the subscripts 0, 1 and 2 to index variables pertaining
to other, lenders, and borrowers, respectively. Borrowers and lenders are both in the market
for borrowed funds. Effective supply of borrowing is b1 and demand for borrowing is
b2. Investors and banks consider themselves small enough that their own borrowing and
lending does not affect asset prices. As in the literature on credit cycles (Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997)), the financial sector alternates between periods of easy and hard credit.
The credit regime is denoted CR and varies continuously between 0 and 1, where CR = 0
denotes the hardest credit regime and CR = 1 denotes the easiest credit regime. In keeping
with the spirit of credit cycle literature, we let the effective supply and demand for borrowed
funds b1 and b2 depend continuously and positively on the availability of credit. That is, for
each agent j, bj1 = b
j
1(CR), and bj2 = bj2(CR), with positive derivatives bj′1 > 0 and bj′2 > 0.
In the following discussion we remove the j superscripts since we will be discussing an
average agent.20
20Since borrowing depends on the credit cycle, our model has an important complementarity, delivering
aggregate effects. Complementarity means that it is more attractive to borrow (or offer credit) if other agents
are doing the same. Strategic complementarities tend to arise in situations of imperfect competition, costly
search for trading partners and preference externalities (Cooper (1999)). These situations can plausibly exist
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The framework is a two-period economy, where we indicate the first period as t and
the second period as t + 1 in order to distinguish the subscripts that refer to time and the
subscripts that refer to agents. In the first period lenders and borrowers interact in the
market for borrowed funds, and sell the securitized loans to the other sector. In the second
period, lenders repay borrowers. If there is an endogenous extreme event in the second
period, this increases the costs of other, lenders and borrowers by an additional c0, c1 and
c2, respectively. The timeline for decisions is shown in Figure 4. For simplicity, we assume
that agents receive all their wealth and make all their repayments in the second period.
Thus, the lender and borrower’s wealth levels in the first period completely derive from
borrowed funds: W1,t = −b1,t(CRt), and W2,t = b2,t(CRt), respectively. In the second
period t+1, the lender and borrower have exogenous potentially unequal wealth levels W¯1
and W¯2, respectively.
We focus on a representative mortgage lender and borrower with utility functions u1
and u2, respectively. Both lender and borrower have locally nonsatiated preferences rep-
resented by concave differentiable utility functions with standard properties, depending
continuously on wealth: u1 = u1(W1) and u2 = u2(W2). Moreover, both u1 and u2 are in-
creasing in wealth, u′1(W1) > 0 and u′2(W2) > 0.21 In order to control for contemporaneous
costs, we consider utility to be net of current costs. Each agent knows there is a possibility
of systemwide extreme events occurring, captured by the probability p, whose functional
form is common knowledge. In the spirit of Fisher (1933) and Allen and Gale (2000), the
probability of future extreme events increases with the average level of borrowed funds,
p = p(b1, b2), where ∂p/∂b1 > 0 and ∂p/∂b2 > 0.22 As mentioned before, if an extreme
event occurs in the future, agent i incurs a positive cost ci, i = 0, 1, 2. This cost is financial,
social and psychological discomfort suffered in an environment of extremes or financial
instability.23 There is no asymmetric information about the likelihood of extremes. Each
for lenders, borrowers and hedge funds, respectively. The credit regime summarizes for each agent how
attractive other agents find it to engage in extensive borrowing or lending. Thus, when one agent borrows or
lends, so do many others in the economy. Therefore an endogenous cause of extremes could be time varying
incentives to offer and accept easy credit, perhaps related to the real estate cycle, as in Pavlov and Wachter
(2006) and Pavlov and Wachter (2007).
21The assumption of increasing utility must hold in the relevant range, otherwise there is no interesting
economic problem: borrowers and lenders would just be automatically prudent, and never in danger of over-
borrowing or over-lending. This assumption helps convey the nature of the economic problem in the US
subprime market.
22This summarizes the intuition that excessive borrowing is destabilizing, without emphasizing the partic-
ular channel of destabilization. Channels through which borrowing leads to increased likelihood of extremes
are explored by a number of authors, including Fisher (1933) and Allen and Gale (2000).
23Two financial costs are the risk of default, and that trading suffers because prices are relatively uninfor-
mative, as in Harris (2003), Chapter 9). A social or psychological cost is increased Knightian uncertainty in
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agent knows that this likelihood increases with average borrowing or lending.24 We now
consider the lender’s problem, in an easy credit regime. Given a loan interest rate r, at pe-
riod t the lender decides how much to lend this period by maximizing utility subject to the
following wealth constraint, which accounts for the possibility of costly extreme events:
W1,t+1 ≥ W¯1 + pt+1(b1,t, b2,t)[b1,t · (1 + r)− c1,t+1] + [1− pt+1(b1,t, b2,t)][b1,t · (1 + r)].
Given locally nonsatiated preferences, this constraint holds as an equality, which simplifies
to W1,t+1 = W¯1 + b1,t · (1 + r)− pt+1(b1,t, b2,t) · c1,t+1. Thus, the lender’s problem is:
maxb1 u1(W1,t) + βu1(W1,t+1), s.t.
W1,t = −b1,t(CRt)
W1,t+1 = W¯1 + b1,t · (1 + r)− pt+1(b1,t, b2,t) · c1,t+1.
After substituting the constraints into the utility arguments, first order conditions for an
interior solution are −u′1(W1,t) + βu′1(W1,t+1)[(1 + r)−
∂pt+1(b1,t,b2,t)
∂b1,t
· c1,t+1] = 0, which
can be rewritten as
∂pt+1(b1,t, b2,t)
∂b1,t
= −
u′1(W1,t)
βu′1(W1,t+1) · c1,t+1
+
1 + r
c1,t+1
. (3)
Equation (3) says that optimally the (derivative of) extreme probability is related to the
marginal rate of substitution for lending funds between periods t and t + 1, discounted by
expected costs. The actual sign of this expression is indeterminate, since expected costs can
be negative or positive. Moreover, marginal utility can be positive or negative when agents
an unstable economy, see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2007) and Weitzman (2007). Implicit in our work
is the notion that this pattern of excess borrowing may recur because of time variation in not just financial
but also moral and psychological costs of overborrowing (Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2007)).
Learning may not occur, since different generations of individuals are involved, given the time of the as-
set cycle. For related ideas, see Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Minsky (1982). This framework parallels
that in theories of corruption and tax evasion: Andvig and Moene (1990) show that supply of corruption in-
creases due to lower moral costs of taking bribes; Sandmo (2005) discusses the possibility, based on a ’social
conscience’ argument, that tax evasion for an individual taxpayer is less risky, the more other taxpayers are
perceived as evading taxes. In similar spirit, we suggest that the costs of over-borrowing for an individual
may depend on the social attitude towards borrowing at the particular time. Thus, there is no a priori reason
to rule out zero or even negative costs of borrowing during the upswing in real estate cycles, for example.
24Similar assumptions occur in many other economic contexts, such as the idea of price taking, competitive
agents used in Arrow and Debreu (1954), Chichilnisky and Wu (2006) and Debreu (1959), even though the
demand of each agent will affect the price to some extent. Such myopic behavior can be found in other
rational settings–for example, investors with log utility decide their portfolios without reference to future
investment opportunities, see Ingersoll (1987) Chapter 11.
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are at a corner solution. An important result, since the first term of the right hand side of
(3) depends on b1,t(CRt) via the budget constraint, is that extreme probabilities respond
to borrowing and to the credit regime. We will use this result to motivate our selection of
instruments in the empirical application of Section 5.
Similarly, the borrower’s problem is
maxb2 u2(W2,t) + βu2(W2,t+1), s.t.
W2,t = b2,t(CRt)
W2,t+1 = W¯2 − b2,t · (1 + r)− pt+1(b1,t, b2,t) · c2,t+1,
which yields first order conditions that can be rewritten as
∂pt+1(b1,t, b2,t)
∂b2,t
=
u′2(W2,t)
βu′2(W2,t+1) · c2,t+1
−
1 + r
c2,t+1
. (4)
As in equation (3), the above expression implies that the future probability of extremes is
dynamic, and depends positively on the current level of credit availability.
Equilibrium: In equilibrium, the demand and supply of borrowed funds will be equal,
b1 = b2 ≡ b. For illustrative purposes, let us consider a symmetric equilibrium where lender
and borrower have identical utility functions and costs, u1 = u2 = u, and c1 = c2 = c.
Assume this symmetry, and equate the optimality conditions for the lender and borrower in
3 and 4: − u
′(W1,t)
βu′(W1,t+1)·ct+1
+ 1+r
ct+1
= u
′(W2,t)
βu′(W2,t+1)·ct+1
− 1+r
ct+1
. This expression implies
1 + r =
1
2β
[
u′(W1,t)
u′(W1,t+1)
+
u′(W2,t)
u′(W2,t+1)
].
Substituting this in equation (4) and simplifying, we obtain that in this equilibrium, extreme
probabilities pt+1 satisfy
dpt+1
dbt
=
1
2βct+1
[
u′(W2,t)
u′(W2,t+1)
−
u′(W1,t)
u′(W1,t+1)
]
(5)
Equation (5) constitutes the signature of endogenous extremes. The responsiveness of ex-
treme probability to borrowing is proportional to the marginal rates of substitution of agents
in the market for borrowed funds.25 If extremes were truly exogenous, there would be no
25 Our result is intuitive: agents affect extreme probability by their optimizing behavior over a certain
variable with external effects. Therefore, optimally their marginal utility relates to the responsiveness of
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statistical relation between extreme probability and b, and ∂p(b)/∂b = 0. The difference
between equations (1) and (5) gives a sense of the estimation error from assuming extremes
are exogenous, when they are in reality endogenous. It is important to note that we have
insufficient information to determine the sign of the sensitivity of extreme events to bor-
rowing, in equation (5). The reason is that we do not know the sign of either expected costs
of extremes c1,t+1 or marginal utility u′1(bt(CRt)). For example, marginal utility may be
negative if wealth-constrained individuals who borrow for house purchase are temporarily
at a corner solution. Similarly, expected costs may be perceived as close to zero or even
negative during euphoric building boom periods, such as those experienced by the USA
from the mid-1990s through the turn of the century, and depicted in Figure 1.
We are not just saying there is a link between over-borrowing and extremes. Instead,
we are showing that even without asymmetric information, over-borrowing may arise as an
equilibrium phenomenon. This phenomenon occurs due to the failure of both borrowers
and lenders to internalize an important externality, the excessive probability of systemwide
future financial crashes. An easy way to see that the probability of crashes is excessive is to
consider what happens if the lender considers the effect of her lending on other agents O,
namely, if she internalizes the costs c0,t+1. Then, using similar logic to that before equation
(3), her problem is identical, except that the second budget constraint becomes
W1,t+1 = W¯1 + bs,t · (1 + r)− pt+1(bs,t, bd,t) · (c0,t+1 + c1,t+1).
Solving the first order conditions and rewriting as before, we obtain the counterpart of
equation (3) for a socially optimal level of extremes:
∂pt+1(bd,t, bs,t)
∂bs,t
= −
u′1(W1,t)
βu′1(W1,t+1) · (c0,t+1 + c1,t+1)
+
1 + r
c0,t+1 + c1,t+1
. (6)
The quantities in equations (3) and (6) will differ in general. Thus, when the lender takes
into account the future costs of other agents, optimal behavior involves a different extreme
probability for a given level of borrowed funds. A similar logic exists for borrowers. It
is in this sense that competitive markets may lead to endogenous, inefficient probability of
extreme probability to this variable. Since the marginal rate of substitution depends on the credit regime
through the budget constraint, the expression also captures the notion that the easiness of credit affects the
likelihood of the financial system’s suffering future crashes.
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crashes.26 To fix ideas, suppose that the terms in equation (6) are all positive, which loosely
speaking implies that the social optimum features relatively lower probability of extremes.
Then there are two ways to express the situation described above. First, as before, we can
recognize that overborrowing due to easy credit has a negative externality, and is therefore
overproduced. Second, in language perhaps closer to regulators’ concerns, we can say that
financial system stability (control of extremes) is a public good, which suffers from classic
underprovision.
We summarize the findings from equations (3) and (6) in the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. In an economy with symmetric preferences and nonzero social costs of
extremes, the equilibrium level of extreme probability is in general not socially optimal,
and depends on equilibrium borrowing as well as the credit regime.
The most important implications from equation (5) relate to the likelihood and persis-
tence of extremes. For a given level of borrowing, the likelihood of future extremes reacts
to the ease of credit, and based on our previous discussion, reacts to any instruments re-
lated to strategic complementarity, such as investor sentiment and consumer confidence.
It decreases with expected social, financial and psychological costs of extremes. Persis-
tence of extremes is higher when the marginal utility of borrowing and costs are persistent.
This finding accords with the behavioral decision research such as Weber (2006), who doc-
uments that low-probability events generate insufficient worry (psychological costs) than
appropriate before they occur.
3.2.1 Extreme Spillovers
The above formulation gives little intuition on spillovers, or the expected breadth of ex-
tremes. To tease out this information, one possibility is to observe that the breadth of
spillovers depends on the strength of aggregation and complementarity. These effects
may be assessed using indices of imperfect competition and search costs, for example (see
Cooper (1999)). However, we feel a more realistic approach is to examine a situation where
spillovers are typically very unlikely to begin with, and then ask what drives spillovers? In
today’s markets, spillovers are increasingly important to consider, since globalization and
26Note that optimality will not necessarily entail complete elimination of extreme events. Rather, the
extreme probability level is adjusted to the point where the marginal benefit to lenders of an additional unit
of the externality-generating activity, u′1(b), equals its marginal cost to other agents, −u′0(b).
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financial innovation not only spread risk, but also hide risk–investors in one sector might
unknowingly bear some part of the risk from agents in distant sectors and nations. These
risks are diversified away in normal times, but may be significant in periods of correlated
returns and dependent defaults. Until now, our model has suggested that spillovers happen
to hedge funds and all other sectors automatically in the subsequent period. This can oc-
cur if other sectors are directly exposed to default risk by purchasing high risk debt from
lenders. In modern financial markets, however, there are numerous ways of diversifying
such risk, for example by securitizing debt into a new instrument. Consequently, even if
several borrowers default, their risk will be spread over many buyers, and therefore have
little impact on each buyer of the securitized asset. What could cause a spillover in this
case? The main channel is a systematic comovement in defaults or selling, as in the LTCM
case during summer of 1998, and in many US financial markets in spring through fall of
2007. Such comovement may result in sharply reduced value of even securitized assets.
If this occurs, then securitized assets become highly undiversified, and may propagate the
effects of extreme events. The question therefore becomes, what could cause a systematic
comovement in defaults or selling? A compelling answer is liquidity. If economic agents
face sharp, simultaneous liquidity drops in many asset classes, they may be forced to de-
fault (borrowers) or sell assets (lenders), which will simultaneously reduce the value of
many securitized assets.27 According to this logic, the incidence of extreme spillovers is
determined at least partially by the extent of liquidity comovement.
More concretely, we present some evidence of the behavior of liquidity during extreme
events, in Figures 5 to 7. The first figures, 5 and 6, show the liquidity measure of Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003) during the stock market crash of 1987 and 1998. In both instances
liquidity dropped sharply. A third incident in which liquidity might have been an issue
concerns the internet bubble’s bursting in 1999 and 2000, which could be considered an
extreme event for internet stocks. Unfortunately we do not have specific data on the liq-
uidity of IT stocks affected in the US. We do, however, have detailed liquidity data and
IT indexes for the Norwegian stock market, which are presented in Figure 7. Again, the
liquidity measures show sharp spikes during the period when the internet bubble was burst-
ing. It is beyond the scope of our paper to prove a definitive link between liquidity and
correlations. Therefore, in addition to the above graphs, we draw attention to several recent
studies that explore such a link, which we became aware of after completing most of this
paper. These liquidity papers are discussed in the literature review of Section 1.1. In sum,
27Since our focus is on extremes, for simplicity we model liquidity as exogenous. In practice liquidity may
respond to changes other variables such as collateral prices (e.g. real estate) for securitized instruments.
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even though individual extreme events may have different causes, there seem to be some
common patterns to extremes, related to borrowing and liquidity.
We offer a simple, stylized formalization of the above arguments, describing a chan-
nel through which other economic agents experience increased extreme probability p. An
important aspect of the economic environment is securitization. Loans are pooled into a
diversified security S, like a CDO, then resold to the other sector at a competitive price
equal to its discounted value. The reason for supply of this asset is evident, since lenders
wish to diversify away their risk. Why does the other sector demand this asset? The reason
is that S may dominate other risky assets, or provide diversification benefits.28 As in spring
and summer of 2007, extreme spillovers are hastened by liquidity demands. To meet these
demands, hedge funds and other investors may sell off a liquid, unrelated tranche such as
municipal bonds. This selloff inhibits liquidity in that tranche, which leads to further sell-
offs in one tranche after another. Therefore, the exogenous driving force behind extreme
spillovers is liquidity comovement–rare but high impact contemporaneous drops in liquid-
ity across various securities. These liquidity shocks increase asset correlations and default
dependence, making them move ’in step’, all selling or defaulting at the same time. In ad-
dition, an important endogenous source of spillover risk is excessive diversification, which
implies the other sector is highly exposed during periods of correlated default.29 This en-
dogenous risk is amplified by inordinate, perhaps unknown, exposure to securitized assets
like CDOs, by various market participants. Why is this endogenous risk left unchecked?
There are three reasons. First, agents may not fully understand rare events. They have
disaster myopia or otherwise underestimate the likelihood of rare events, as documented
by (Herring and Wachter (2005)), Hertwig, Barron, Weber, and Erev (2005), and Pavlov
and Wachter (2006). It is well known that myopic behavior can arise for even rational
preferences, for example in the case of logarithmic utility. Other reasons why agents do
not understand rare events include limited computational ability, or statistical issues–it is
hard to estimate the probability of rare events with limited data.30 Second, even if some
28In practice, CDOs are often bought by fixed income investors in search of high yields. CDOs will be at
least as attractive as high yield bonds because the former are generally uncorrelated. In the present situation,
sub-prime CDOs had relatively low risk when the real estate market was going up, since the collateral was
extremely valuable. We are grateful to Arjun Jayaraman for discussions on this point.
29Paradoxically, therefore, diversification can increase risk during extreme periods, since investors have a
wider network of obligations, and are thus more likely to affect others and be affected by an extreme event in
any sector. This relates to work of (Chichilnisky (2004), Danielsson and Shin (2003), Dembo, Deuschel, and
Duffie (2003) and Ibragimov and Walden (2007).
30Underweighting of rare events has been documented in several ways. First, agents may discount rare
events when they estimate probabilities based on experience (Barron and Erev (2003), Hertwig, Barron, We-
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individuals take rare events seriously, when liquidity is high, the ease of resale makes them
more comfortable with elevated risk, since they feel they can resell if necessary. Third,
during some stages of the asset cycle the collateral for securitized debt has a relatively high
price. In the subprime market case the collateral is real estate, which featured rising prices
around the turn of the century, as shown in Figure 1. Such a scenario can be another cause
of complacency, since the value of collateral is high.
More formally, the mortgages are packaged into m securitized assets S1, ..., Sj ..., Sm,
each with 1/m of the original securities, for maximal diversification. Each original mort-
gage i yields a stream of payments with liquidity-adjusted excess returns rei,t. For simplicity,
we assume symmetric correlations and standard deviations: ρij,t = ρ, all i 6= j, and σi = σ
for all i. The return on each securitized asset is rS,t, with mean r¯S,t = 1m
m∑
i=1
ri,t = r¯i,t. The
variance is denoted σ2S,t, and computed as31
σ2S,t =
1
m
(σ2 + 2ρ). (7)
We now define an extreme spillover, then discuss the role of liquidity.
Definition 5: An Extreme Spillover is an ω−extreme event in Sj. That is, a situation
where |rS,t − r¯t−1| ≥ ωσS,t−1.
In order to implement Definition 5, we need explicit expressions for portfolio returns, which
we now develop. Previous research has documented that the correlation of asset returns,
ber, and Erev (2005), and Rabin (2002)). Moreover, econometrically there is a bias to under-estimate rare
events (King and Zeng (2001), and de Haan and Sinha (1999)). Finally, expected utility does not effectively
incorporate low probabilities (Bhide (2000) and Chichilnisky (2000)). All of these effects may be com-
pounded by the fact that every few years, a new generation of borrowers needs to learn how to compute the
likelihood of rare events.
31To obtain equation (7), note that the security variance σ2S,t is the variance of a sum of random variables,
V ar
[
m∑
i=1
1
m
rei,t
]
=
m∑
i=1
1
m2
V ar(rei,t) + 2
∑
i6=j
∑
i6=j
1
m2
Cov(rei,t, r
e
j,t).
This can be computed as
1
m2
∑
i
σ2i + 2
∑
i6=j
∑
i6=j
1
m2
ρij =
mσ2i
m2
+ 2
mρij
m2
=
σ2
m
+
2ρ
m
,
where the last equality invokes the identical variance and correlation assumption from above.
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and correlation of defaults tend to increase together during extreme periods.32 We formalize
this empirical observation starkly by saying that individual mortgages are uncorrelated in
general, but highly correlated a small fraction δ of the time. This is represented as a regime
shift,
ρ =

 ρ
hi, with probability δ
0, with probability 1− δ,
(8)
where δ is close to zero. Given assumption (8), the securitized asset variance in equation
(7) is nonlinear, equalling σ2
m
most of the time, and equalling σ2
m
+ 2ρ
hi
m
a small fraction
of the time. Thus, the benefits of diversification accrue to the securitized asset in typical
times, when its variance is much smaller than the sum of the individual security variances.
By contrast, during extreme times correlations become important for returns, and diversifi-
cation benefits evaporate.
These extreme correlations are driven by liquidity. In particular, most of the time liquidity is
plentiful in some markets. However, a small fraction δ of the time, liquidity dries up in most
markets, which forces multi-market margin calls and flight to quality. Consequently, there
is an increase in defaults and delinquent payments across many assets, and their returns
enter a high correlation regime. We assume liquidity drives the correlation regimes in (8)
directly.33 Specifically, liquidity is an additive cost or benefit to gross returns ri,t–mortgage
securities have higher excess returns rei,t if idiosyncratic liquidity Li,t is positive, and a
lower return if it is negative:
rei,t = ri,t + Li,t.
Average gross returns are equal across the individual mortgages, and over time, 1
m
∑m
i=1(ri,t =
r¯i,t = r¯i,t−1. Thus the most important dynamics come from liquidity.34 Every period there
is an exogenous liquidity shock Li,t to the return on each mortgage. Most of the time
32See for example, Ang and Bekaert (2002), Cappiello, Engle, and Sheppard (2006), Dembo, Deuschel,
and Duffie (2003), and Embrechts, Frey and McNeil (2005), page 331.
33Our liquidity cost is in similar spirit to Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and Jacoby, Fowler and Gottes-
man (2002), who model liquidity as a proportional cost relative to the security price.
34Alternatively, we can think of this as the gross returns being net of other effects, since we wish to
concentrate on liquidity shocks.
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these shocks are uncorrelated and zero-mean, 1
m
∑m
i=1 Li,t = 0. Somewhat rarely they are
perfectly correlated, as in the following sort of structure:
Li,t =

 ∼ i.i.d. Uniform[−1, 1], with probability 1− δL−t , with probability δ (9)
where L−t is a large negative number.35 This setup produces spillovers because, in the rare
regimes, liquidity costs reduce the value of every component of the securitized assets Sj.
That is, the Sj inherits the liquidity costs of all its component securities:
rS,t =


1
m
∑m
i=1(ri,t + Li,t) = r¯i,t + 0, with probability 1− δ
1
m
∑m
i=1(ri,t + Li,t) = r¯i,t + L
−
t , with probability δ.
(10)
To see how this can lead to an extreme spillover, consider a correlated liquidity shock in
period t (the δ− rare regime), while period t − 1 features the typical uncorrelated shock.
Recall from Definition 5 that an extreme spillover occurs when
|rS,t − r¯t−1| ≥ ωσS,t−1. (11)
From equation (10), the left side of (11) satisfies
|rS,t − r¯t−1| = L
−. (12)
The right hand side of (11), using equation (7), satisfies
ωσS,t−1 = ω
1
m1/2
[σ2t−1 + 2ρt−1]
1/2 = ω
σt−1
m1/2
, (13)
where the last equality uses the fact that ρt−1 = 0 before the onset of the correlated liquidity
shock. Combining (12) and (13) yields the condition for extreme spillover: L−t ≥ ω σt−1m1/2 ,
or
lnL−t ≥ lnω + ln σt−1 −
1
2
lnm. (14)
This expression is intuitive. In an environment where returns depend on liquidity shocks,
extreme spillovers will happen if a liquidity shock is large enough relative to average return
volatility σt−1. The term − lnm is also natural, since the larger the number of borrowers,
the more sources of hidden risk in S and therefore the lower the liquidity shock needed to
35Alternatively, we could say there is a shift of the distribution, for example to L ∼ U [2L−t , 0]. Since L−t
is negative, the mean is now negative.
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set off an extreme event.36 This expression predicts that extreme events will tend to spill
over and persist when liquidity shocks are large relative to average volatility of individual
instruments. We will use this insight in our empirical exploration of Section 5, below.
A key question for investors and regulators is what determines the incidence and per-
sistence of extreme spillovers? According to equation (14) this depends on the average
number m of borrowers in a securitized debt instrument, and the amount of liquidity co-
movement.37 Thus, the breadth and persistence of extreme spillovers depends on liquidity
comovement and persistence of liquidity shocks. If we are interested in predicting the ex-
tent of endogenous versus exogenous extremes, note that exogenous extremes should be
fairly contained, ceteris paribus. Endogenous extremes are only limited by the extent of
liquidity comovement and diversification.
4 Potential Policy Implications
What well-defined question can this framework help us answer? While we have provided a
simple analysis of economic extremes in general, we feel our approach is especially suited
to address the puzzles discussed in the introduction. Our framework suggests that the sub-
prime market and spillover puzzles can be understood as the result of an uninternalized
externality, the effect of excessive borrowing on financial stability. This is not a simple ex-
ternality, but a multilateral, public externality. It is generated by and affects many agents,
for example mortgage lenders, borrowers, hedge funds, and even global investors. To solve
this type of public externality the introduction of a standard sort of market will not be op-
timal, due to the free rider problem and the impact of liquidity.38 We now discuss liquidity
and externalities, in turn.
Our model suggests that liquidity is important and should be monitored carefully.39
There are many aspects to liquidity’s importance. Perhaps the most crucial is our implicit
notion that liquidity has a dual role: high liquidity helps initiate extremes by providing
36Having a large enough L− will reduce diversification benefits because it involves adding a highly depen-
dent risk to a portfolio.
37Another influence will be the degree of diversification, that is, the average share CDOs held by individ-
uals.
38Private externalities are depletable, while public externalities are non-depletable, and retain potency for
all who are affected. For an exposition of multilateral externalities, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green
(1995), Chapter 11.
39For a discussion of what constitutes plausible liquidity measures, see Chollete, Nas, and Skjeltorp (2007).
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a market for securitized debt; and correlated liquidity drives the subsequent spillovers.
Regarding initiating extremes, the risk of counterparty default is unimportant if there is
enough liquidity and innovation for a lender to repackage and resell her debt. Regardless
of information structure, once individuals feel they have enough liquidity, they may take
excessive risk. Thus, information asymmetry may become less relevant in an environment
of plentiful liquidity. Regarding spillovers, in the face of correlated liquidity events, all
diversification benefits might disappear, and even pooled securities can experience a sharp
drop in value. Therefore, liquidity amplifies endogenous extremes, which aggregate from
one sector to the larger economy because of complementarities due to the credit cycle, and
externalities. Since control of these extremes has public externality aspects, it is unlikely
that an individual agent will provide the public liquidity necessary to avert systemwide
extremes.40 Why do agents produce endogenous extremes in the first place? There are two
main reasons, disaster myopia and externalities: the effects of excessive borrowing happen
somewhat rarely, in the future, and mainly to others. Individuals may not fully internalize
the cost of elevated future extremes because this probability is considered relatively low
and distant, and individuals have a bias to underweight low probability events. These two
reasons are reinforced for both borrowers and lenders by liquidity, as described above.
Why do individual regulatory authorities allow excess extremes to happen, once started?
An important reason is that it is difficult to predict extremes. Furthermore, there is a free
riding problem at the domestic and international level. Finally, there is moral hazard– there
is a knife edge aspect to central bank supplying liquidity to calm extremes, since liquidity
is what can initiate extremes in the first place.
Understanding the externality aspect of extremes may enable us to address not just the
effects but also the causes of extremes. The externality issue gives lenders and borrow-
ers inadequate incentives, leading to an overproduction of extremes. In order to correct
this, a standard public finance solution involves giving agents pecuniary or property right
incentives to reach the optimality condition in (6). Given the diversity of agents and na-
tions in the current situation, two further suggestions that we think plausible are to create
an international institution responsible for monitoring global system stability, and to dele-
gate responsibility reciprocally, for providing aggregate liquidity and control of extremes.
The former would ensure information sharing and avoid costly international duplication of
effort. The latter would be a global market maker, ensuring public provision of a global
40An exception is John Rockefeller in the Wall Street panic of 1907.
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public good.41 Let us discuss these three solutions. First, ex ante incentives include sub-
sidizing housing and borrowing, and assigning or auctioning tradeable extreme production
rights. A related incentive involves educating borrowers and lenders on the nature of liq-
uidity shocks, and the consequences of endogenous, extreme price changes.42 Second, a
monitor of lending and borrowing activity, and diversification of portfolios, would have
special tasks. It would assess adequate levels of borrowing and lending (given average liq-
uidity), and provide indices of current and expected liquidity levels, and indices of average
risk in all securitized assets that could be subject to hidden risk during extremes.43 Third, a
global market maker would be used as an ex post measure. Since systemwide liquidity is a
public good, each actor has an incentive to free ride, therefore liquidity effects may be per-
sistent, once extremes begin. Public provision of systemwide liquidity is thus necessary to
disrupt persistence of liquidity shocks. Reciprocal delegation of the role of global market
maker will allow for efficient provision, and remove the free rider issue at the individual,
national and global level.44 These three prescriptions together may reduce extremes, and
ensure that financial markets pay an appropriate price for the extremes they produce.
5 Empirical Application
An important pre-condition for the policy analysis described in the previous section is
empirical documentation of the properties of extreme probabilities, to which we now turn.
Since each asset price series may have individual characteristics, we focus on one that
summarizes aggregate security performance, and for which there is a relatively long time
series of daily observations, the Dow Jones Industrial Average.
41For literature on delegated monitoring, see Diamond (1984) and Sheard (1994). This would in-
volve coordination of international regulatory authorities, for example, each taking turn as delegated mon-
itor. Regarding global market makers, a related suggestion has been made by Buiter and Siebert, at
http://maverecon.blogspot.com/2007/08/central-banks-in-time-of-crisis.html. For a global market maker,
there is of course a moral hazard problem.
42Similar to pollution permits, these would allow the market participants to engage in reasonable levels of
borrowing or lending even during times of low aggregate liquidity.
43Such global monitoring of liquidity, hidden risk and extremes, should be delegated because of its public
good aspects, and to avoid costly duplication (Diamond (1984), Sheard (1994)).
44This is similar to what is already done by individual regulator authorities, pumping in liquidity. The
difference is that it would be coordinated internationally in a systematic way. More generally, our suggestions
are related to the prescriptions of Sandmo (2003), who outlines issues in providing global public goods, and
Weber (2006), who recommends generation of appropriate concern as a necessary condition for mitigating
externality-driven rare events.
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Our main data comprises the following series: daily Dow Jones Industrial Average
series (DJIA), from May 26, 1896 to September 28, 2007; the degree of securitization in
US financial markets (SEC), available from January 1989 to December 2006; the liquidity
measure (LIQ) of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) available from April 1962 to December
2006; the value of real estate loans in the US (REALLOAN) available from January 1947
to July 2007; and a measure of investor sentiment (DSENT1), used in the study of Baker
and Wurgler (2007). The DSENT1 data is available from January 1966 to December 2005,
and kindly provided at Professor Jeffrey Wurgler’s website.45 Unless otherwise noted, the
data are all monthly frequency, and obtained from WRDS and Datastream.
There are three steps to our empirical approach. First, we examine whether our p series
are significantly different from zero. Second, we examine their dynamics by considering
autoregressive time series models . Third, we begin to analyze endogeneity by using simple
VAR and logistic models. We discuss each of the above in turn.
5.1 Computing the pt Series, and Summary statistics
The main series we compute is pt(ω), according to Definition 4 in Section 2.3. Using the
DJIA described above as our base series, we compute the proportion of times each month
that there is an observation more than ω standard deviations away from the median. Both
the median and standard deviation are computed over the preceding k months, where k =
12, 24, 60 and 120. This procedure is done on a rolling basis.46 An example of the pt
series for the 12 month reference period is shown in Figure 8. As should be expected, the
probability of extremes becomes much less active as we move from 1 or 2 sigma events to
3-sigma and beyond. Evidently, the series move around quite a bit, so even from a visual
perspective the series are not constant.
Figures 9 and 10 display histograms of our extreme probabilities for 1 and 2 sigma
events. In both cases there is a u-shaped pattern for all reference periods. Moreover, the
longer reference periods tend to have more mass concentrated at 0 and 1. Thus, when
45Since the empirical probability series are between 0 and 1, and SEC and REALLOAN are in billions of
dollars, we use percentage changes in SEC and the ratio of real estate loans to total loans, in order to scale
them down comparably.
46Recall that the series begins in May 1896. Thus, for example, to compute the pt(1) for a 12 month
reference period, we count the number of times in June 1897 that the DJIA exceeded 1 standard deviation
from the median, which were calculated from May 1896 to May 1897. We then do the same for July 1897,
where the median and standard are calculated from June 1896 to June 1897, and so on.
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economic agents actually compute extremes in this range (1 and 2 sigma events), their
probability estimates will tend to be more volatile. Figures 11 to 13 show histograms
for extreme probabilities of 3- to 5-sigma events in the DJIA. As we would expect, the
distributions become more concentrated at zero, with the shortest horizon (12 months)
being the last to have all probabilities at zero.
We now turn to summary statistics and more formal tests. Table 2 shows that as the
level of ω increases, both the mean and standard deviation decrease. However both the
t-test and nonparametric sign rank test generally have minute p-values until the level of
ω = 5. This suggests that the likelihood of extreme events beyond 2 standard deviations
may be non-zero, regardless of agents’ reference periods.
Is there a difference in extreme probabilities within reference periods? We test this
hypothesis in Table 3. Except for some marginal significance between 4 and 5 sigma events,
there is very little evidence of similarity between the various extreme probabilities within
a given reference period. A different pattern emerges, however, when we examine tests for
differences across reference periods, in Table 4. This latter table reports mixed evidence
about the similarity of average extreme probability depending on the reference period. This
result may be of practical relevance, if different investor groups have different time horizons
when deciding whether a particular event is extreme.
5.2 Dynamics
As we discussed in Sections 1 and 3, the dynamic behavior of extreme probabilities has
important impacts for risk management and stress testing. We therefore examine the time
series behavior of our pt(ω) series. The results are displayed in Table 5.47 Importantly,
except for the very extreme 5-sigma events, the Q-test of white noise is rejected. This
suggests that there are important dynamics in the likelihood of extreme events. The best-
fitting models generally range from AR(1) to AR(3), although there are a few models with
higher lags. Thus, our empirical probabilities seem to exhibit memory–extreme events
cluster over time, regardless of our reference period.
47Note that some series had insufficient variance to compute time series models. This was particularly the
case with the 5-sigma extremes, since much of it consists of zeros.
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5.3 Endogeneity
While extreme dynamics relate mainly to investment, extreme endogeneity also relates to
policy analysis and financial stability. The results of this section are exploratory, since our
theoretical guidance is quite general. Ideally, we would like to assess whether pt depends on
plausible aspects of economic behavior, suggested by theory. Based on our Section 3 dis-
cussion, some examples are borrowing, and investor sentiment. However, our ideas about
endogeneity come from equations (5) and 14, which are not easily testable. For exam-
ple, the empirical probability of extremes will depend on other factors besides borrowing
behavior and liquidity. In addition, for simplicity we model the cause of period t + 1’s
extremes to occur in t, while in practice, there may be substantial lag affects. Without spe-
cific parametric assumptions on the utility function, we cannot test (5) directly. Moreover,
as mentioned before, it is difficult to obtain estimates of the expected costs of overborrow-
ing.48 Therefore, we only feel comfortable testing a set of relatively simple hypotheses,
namely that ∂p(b)/∂b = 0.
We therefore use simple 3-variable vector autoregressions to examine both the effect
of borrowing and liquidity on extreme probabilities. In light of our Section 3 discussion,
we first examine whether borrowing and the general state of investor sentiment affect the
probability of extreme events. Our proxy for borrowing is REALLOAN, and for sentiment
is DSENT1, described above. The results from these tests are displayed in Table 6, which
displays orthogonalized impulse responses for REALLOAN and DSENT1, with respect to
extreme probabilities. For all reference periods the VAR is either first or second order. In
general, the standard errors are large, therefore it is not easy to make strong statements.
One possibility that emerges from this table is that the effects of a shock in REALLOAN
may persist and even increase over time. For example, in Panel B, the effect of a shock in
real estate loans on 4-σ event probabilities is around 0.0003 in the first month (k=1), and
increases monotonically to 0.0004 by the twelfth month.
We also attempt to glean a preliminary sense of the spillover effect discussed in Section
3.2.1 above, by using a separate VAR. The results are in Table 7. Specifically, in the spirit
of equation (14), we estimate a VAR that contains extreme probabilities, liquidity (LIQ)
and percentage change in securitization (PCTSEC), as described above.49 The liquidity
estimates have large standard errors. However, securitization is marginally significant in
48Options markets may provide a simple estimate of expected costs, but this is a relatively small market,
and not necessarily the same as the market for real estate mortgage borowers.
49We exclude the 4-sigma events since their estimation generally does not converge.
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some cases at the 6 and 12 month lags. For example, in Panel D, the relevant impulse
response is significant for 2-σ events. In most cases, however, the standard errors are large,
perhaps reflecting the persistence documented in Table (5), and the relatively short sample.
This suggests the importance of finding better instruments for liquidity and securitization,
with a longer sample.
One issue in the above results is the large autocorrelation of our empirical probabilities.
From a practical point of view, these point estimates are less useful than early warning
signals that indicate whether the economy is likely to be in a range corresponding to ’high’
levels of extreme events. From a statistical viewpoint, the use of ranges is attractive for
several reasons. Importantly, estimation of ranges is valuable for incorporating model un-
certainty, as discussed by Granger, White, and Kamstra (1989) and Hansen (2006).50 Range
based empirical methods have also been used successfully in financial economics, for ex-
ample by Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold (2002). In light of these considerations, we take
another look at endogeneity, by dividing the empirical probabilities into three ranges, Low,
Medium and High. Low corresponds to empirical probabilities less than 0.33, Medium to
the range 0.33 to 0.67, and High to the range 0.67 to 1. We then estimate a cumulative lo-
gistic model for all the various reference periods.51 The estimated model shows the effect
of each explanatory variable on the likelihood of High levels of extreme probabilities. For
example, the estimated coefficient on REALLOAN shows the relation between a one-unit
increase in real estate borrowing and the likelihood of being in a period of High extreme
probabilities. In light of equation (14), we include dummy variables for low, medium and
high levels of liquidity, namely, LIQ0, LIQ1 and LIQ2, respectively, as well as interaction
terms between liquidity and real estate borrowing. The results are reported in Tables 8 to
11, which we now discuss.52 As mentioned before, we are primarily interested in the sig-
nificance of our explanatory variables rather than their sign, because we have no plausible
50While using ranges can be argued to lose information in the current context, it allows us to test the
important economic concept of whether there are some threshold effects, where extremes are triggered by
excessive borrowing, or insufficient liquidity, for example. For an introduction to the benefit of using interval
estimation, see Chapter 9 of Casella and Berger (1990).
51Logistic regression with k explanatory variables is based on the following empirical model: g(p) =
α + β1X1 + ... + βkXk. The link function g(p) is linearly related to the explanatory variables, and in the
case of logistic regression, the link function is the logit or log-odds, g(p) = log(p/(1 − p)). Thus, in our
application, we are estimating the effect of various explanatory variables on the (log of the) probability of
high extremes divided by the probability of no high extremes. A similar methodology has been used in
explaining crises, by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001).
52Note that the full set of explanatory variables is only available from 1989 to 2005. During this period
the 4 and 5 sigma extremes featured only zeros for all reference periods. Therefore we can only estimate and
report estimation results for 1- to 3-sigma extremes.
28
variables for expected costs from equation (5), which could be either negative or positive.
Since three sigma events exhibit less variation (mostly zeros and ones), the model fit for
these events is not as good as for the other cases. With the exception of 2-sigma events in
the two year reference period, the models generally work well for 1 and 2 sigma extremes,
as documented by the small p-values for the LR, Score and Wald tests.53
The most striking finding is that for all reference periods, real estate borrowing is signif-
icantly related at the 5% level to high probability of extremes for at least one specification:
1-sigma events, 2-sigma events, or both. For example, in Table 8, the estimated coefficient
on REALLOAN is -21.52, with a p-value of 0.0052. Moreover, in the same table, a low
level of liquidity (LIQ0) is significant for high extremes. This latter result holds for 1 and 2
sigma events, both individually and in interaction with real estate borrowing. The amount
of securitization, SECPCT, is significant only for 2-sigma extremes at the 10 year horizon.
The investor sentiment variable DSENT1, is never significant.54
To summarize our empirical exploration, The main findings on the nature of extremes
is that extreme probabilities are dynamic and persistent, as documented in Tables 2 through
5. The evidence on the causes of extremes gives some support for endogeneity. A VAR
analysis suggests that instruments related to borrowing and securitization may play a small
role in the dynamics of extreme probabilities, although given the strong persistence in the
raw probabilities, this analysis often delivers large standard errors. More encouragingly, a
cumulative logistic analysis shows that the level of real estate borrowing is related to high
likelihood of extremes for at least one specification in all reference periods. Moreover, we
document that current illiquidity may interact with past real estate borrowing to affect the
likelihood of extreme events. These latter empirical findings corroborate the theoretical
and anecdotal evidence of Allen and Gale (2000) and Fisher (1933), and support the idea
that extremes may be endogenous.
6 Conclusions
In light of recent developments in financial markets, our paper develops and tests a simple,
positive approach to extreme events. This approach suggests that some extreme events may
53These three statistics test the null hypothesis that all the explanatory variables have zero coefficients.
54The estimation reports two intercepts because cumulative logit computes it that way, one less than the
number of categories in the dependent variable
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vary systematically over time, and might be explained and forecasted on the basis of eco-
nomic theory. In addition to creating a taxonomy, we have four main contributions. First,
we distinguish exogenous from endogenous extremes, the latter of which can be understood
in the framework of externalities. This distinction is particularly important when there is
the possibility of large spillovers, and has immediate policy implications: for truly exoge-
nous extremes, we must often focus on ex post protection, while for endogenous extremes,
we can use economic incentives. Therefore, in tackling subprime issues, or anywhere that
individuals’ actions spill over to harm economic stability, we have at our disposal a new set
of public finance tools in addition to the traditional solutions of interest rates. Second, we
show the ’signature’ of different types of extremes. In relation to the signature of extremes,
we provide some insight on their incidence and size. According to equation (5), they are
more responsive to borrowing if expected costs are lower and credit is easier. According
to equation (14), extremes have a higher incidence if correlated liquidity shocks dominate
volatility, and if the degree of securitization m is large. Third, in light of our model and
empirical findings that extremes have memory and may be endogenous, we propose co-
ordination of global regulatory authorities in controlling extreme events. In addition to
providing incentives for borrowers and lenders, this global coordination will involve moni-
toring and sharing information on liquidity and extremes, activities that have global public
good qualities. Finally, on the empirical side, we have computed extreme probabilities for
various reference periods, and have shown that in many cases extremes are neither rare nor
constant. We carry out our estimation on several reference periods, which give us some de-
gree of robustness. In most cases extreme probabilities are significantly different from zero,
and have strong autoregressive components–there is memory in extremes. An exploratory
vector autoregression analysis suggests that some instruments based on theory may have
small effects on extreme probability that evolve over many months. More encouragingly,
a cumulative logistic analysis shows that between 1989 to 2005, real estate borrowing and
(to a smaller extent) market liquidity can help to explain the likelihood of experiencing
extreme events.
It is important to bear in mind that while our paper begins to open the black box of
extremes, we do not claim to predict all extremes. Instead, we wish to show that, far from
being random, some extremes may have similar dynamic patterns, and may be related to
economic fundamentals. Our central concepts, embodied in equations (5) and (14), are the
externality argument, and the notion that information-based incentives are counteracted by
liquidity and credit cycles before extreme events. These concepts yield quite new and un-
expected implications for economic behavior and regulatory policy in securities markets.
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A major implication is that if we can identify the signature of endogenous extremes, we
may potentially counter them using other tools in addition to traditional interest rate man-
agement by central banks. Thus, it is not necessary to try to remove extremes ex post,
agents may do it themselves, given the right ex ante incentives. Another implication is that
anything driving the credit cycle will increase the likelihood of extremes, for example, in-
novation or loose interest rates. A final implication is that global coordination of regulatory
bodies extends the idea of ’too big to fail’ to an international setting, where the institution
in question is the entire global economy. In the future, such coordination may help ensure
effective domestic and global diversification.
This paper may be seen as a first step on the road to incorporating extreme events into
standard economic analysis. Even if the particular channel of endogeneity differs from the
one we focus on (borrowing), the message remains: endogenous extreme events may be
prevented using tools from public finance. By viewing extremes as the outcome of opti-
mizing behavior, we can attempt to address the proximate cause, for example, reducing the
demand for overborrowing by subsidizing certain house purchases. Our approach differs
from previous work because we give a method for computing, detecting and predicting ex-
cessive extreme events. Another difference is that we suggest ex ante and ex post methods
for dealing with extremes. Important extensions to this work include dynamic modelling,
and identifying the various channels of endogenous extremes encountered in practice. Re-
finements of this approach are an exciting task for future research.
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in US House Prices.
The figure shows the percentage change in the Case-Shiller US House Price Index, relative to the previous
year. Source: Standard and Poors.
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Figure 2: UK banks’ price of borrowing.
The figure shows the price of interbank borrowing in the UK. The solid (red) line is the 3-month interbank
rate and the dotted (green) line is the base rate. Source: DataStream.
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Table 1: Two Examples of Endogenous Probabilities
Effects felt mainly in one Spillover effects
market or transaction in many markets
Asymmetric Information Moral Hazard
Symmetric or Asymmetric
Information Endogenous Extremes
Figure 3: Frequency and Impact of Extreme Events in Nature, 1974-2003.
Source: EM-DAT.
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Figure 4: Sequence of Events.
The figure shows the timing of decisions in our stylized model. p¯ is a threshold level of extreme probability
where spillovers to other sectors begin. Endogenous extremes occur during easy credit regimes, exogenous
extremes occur during hard credit regimes. The spillover costs c0, c1, c2 include costs related to default,
financial instability and aggregate uncertainty.
t = 0
Mortgagors
borrow $b

























1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
XXz
X
X
X
X
X
X
Xz





:
Easy credit regime (b = bhi)
Likelihood of extremes is phi(b) > p¯
Hard credit regime (b = blo)
Likelihood of extremes is plo(b) < p¯
t = 1
Extremes
(endogenous)
Ordinary times
Extremes
(exogenous)
Ordinary times
b(1 + r) + c2 c0 + c1 + c2
b(1 + r) 0
b(1 + r) + c2 c1 + c2
b(1 + r) 0
Borrower’s
Costs:
Social
Costs:
39
Figure 5: Marketwide Liquidity during the 1987 Crash.
The figure shows the level of the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure in the period around the US
stock market crash of 1987.
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Figure 6: Marketwide Liquidity during the LTCM Event in 1998.
The figure shows the level of the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure around the time of the
LTCM events in summer 1998.
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Figure 7: Marketwide Liquidity during the Burst of the Internet Bubble.
Figure (a) shows the level of the Oslo Stock Exchange IT index and the total number of trades each month.
Figure (b) shows the average (across companies) quoted spread and depth at the Oslo Stock Exchange each
month. Source: Chollete, Nas, and Skjeltorp (2007).
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Figure 8: Time Series of Extremes
The figure shows a sample of the time series for various levels of extreme probabilities, from 1967 to 2007.
The relevant reference period is 12 months.
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Figure 9: The Distribution of 1-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed one stan-
dard deviation from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 10: The Distribution of 2-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed two stan-
dard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 11: The Distribution of 3-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed three
standard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples,
ranging from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 12: The Distribution of 4-sigma Events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed four stan-
dard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Figure 13: The Distribution of 5-sigma events.
The histogram shows the empirical probability of Dow-Jones Industrial Average levels that exceed five stan-
dard deviations from the relevant median. The median is calculated over different reference samples, ranging
from 12 months to 120 months.
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Table 2: Basic Properties of Extreme Probabilities pt(ω)
Panel A: 12-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.6288 0.4202 < 0.0001 <0.0001
(ω = 2): 0.2647 0.3806 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0542 0.1768 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0098 0.0739 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 5): 0.0033 0.0437 0.0056 0.0020
Panel B: 24-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.6189 0.4439 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 2): 0.2489 0.3906 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0517 0.1844 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0044 0.0502 0.0014 < 0.0001
(ω = 5): 0.0010 0.0291 0.2060 0.5000
Panel C: 60-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.5787 0.4680 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
45
(ω = 2): 0.2450 0.4083 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0496 0.1899 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0026 0.0445 0.0368 0.0313
(ω = 5): 0.0007 0.0259 0.3175 1.000
Panel D: 120-month reference period
Mean Standard P-value for P-value for
Deviation t-test sign rank test
(ω = 1): 0.6038 0.4711 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 2): 0.2961 0.4413 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 3): 0.0908 0.2722 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 4): 0.0086 0.0732 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
(ω = 5): 0.0000 0.0000 . .
The table shows stylized facts for the time series of extreme probabilities
pt(ω). As in the text, ω denotes the number of standard deviations away
from the relevant median. The t- and sign rank tests examine whether the
mean differs significantly from zero.
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Table 3: P-values for Test of Differences Within Reference Periods
Panel A: 12-month reference period
1-σ vs 2-σ 1-σ vs 3-σ 1-σ vs 4-σ 1-σ vs 5-σ 2-σ vs 3-σ 2-σ vs 4-σ 2-σ vs 5-σ 3-σ vs 4-σ 3-σ vs 5-σ 4-σ vs 5-σ
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Panel B: 24-month reference period
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0018
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Panel C: 60-month reference period
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0530
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0313
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 0.0313
Panel D: 120-month reference period
t-test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
Sign test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
SR test: < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001
The table shows the p-values from statistical tests for significant differences in the means of our pt(ω) series,
for various levels of extreme events. SR denotes the sign rank test.
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Table 4: P-values for Test of Differences Across Reference Periods
Panel A: 1-σ Events
12- vs 24-month 24- vs 60-month 60- vs 120-month 12- vs 120-month
t-test: 0.6024 0.0032 0.0408 0.1750
Sign test: 0.8438 0.0009 0.0049 0.4969
SR test: 0.6499 0.0028 0.0469 0.0710
Panel B: 2-σ Events
t-test: 0.1012 0.8694 <0.0001 0.0417
Sign test: 0.1198 0.1902 <0.0001 0.6960
SR test: 0.0998 0.9772 <0.0001 0.0146
Panel C: 3-σ Events
t-test: 0.9167 0.9404 <0.0001 <0.0001
Sign test: 0.3580 0.1679 <0.0001 0.9508
SR test: 0.8088 0.7975 <0.0001 <0.0001
Panel D: 4-σ Events
t-test: 0.0073 0.3936 0.0187 0.8629
Sign test: 0.0026 0.0490 0.0023 0.4885
SR test: 0.0004 0.2112 0.0114 0.7465
Panel E: 5-σ Events
t-test: 0.0203 0.2306 0.3175 0.0111
Sign test: 0.0156 0.5000 1.0000 0.0078
SR test: 0.0156 0.5000 1.0000 0.0078
The table shows the p-values from statistical tests for significant differences in the
means of our series, for various levels of extreme events. SR denotes sign rank test.
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Table 5: Time Series properties of Extreme Probabilities
Panel A: 12-month reference period
1-σ 2-σ 3-σ 4-σ 5-σ
Q-test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 0.4192
Selected Model: AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) AR(1)
Q-test of residuals 0.1729 0.0266 0.3694 0.9654 0.9982
Panel B: 24-month reference period
Q-Test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 1.0000
Selected Model: AR(2) AR(2) AR(2) AR(4) NA
Q-test of residuals 0.0952 0.0949 0.8880 0.2330 NA
Panel C: 60-month reference period
Q-test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 1.0000
Selected Model: AR(1) AR(4) AR(4) AR(3) NA
Q-test of residuals 0.4002 0.0575 0.0166 0.1698 NA
Panel D: 120-month reference period
Q-test, original series < 0.0001 < 0.0001 < 0.0001 <0.0001 NA
Selected Model: AR(2) AR(1) AR(3) AR(5) NA
Q-test of residuals 0.0327 0.0349 0.2157 0.5157
The table shows the results of time series estimation of the
pt(ω) series, for different reference periods. NA denotes
’not applicable’, where estimation did not converge.
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Table 6: k-Period Impulse Responses: Sentiment and Borrowing
Panel A: 12-month reference period
1-σ 2-σ 3-σ 4-σ
Impulse Response for DSENT1
k=1 -0.05897 (0.04603) 0.02139 (0.04586) 0.06479 (0.04618) 0.07833 (0.04625)
k=6 -0.00196 (0.00278) -0.00381 (0.00331) -0.00328 (0.00245) 0.00001 (0.00015)
k=12 -0.00001 (0.00006) -0.00003 (0.00012) -0.00003 (0.00026) 0.00001 (0.00016)
Impulse Response for REALLOAN
k=1 0.00008 (0.00011) 0.00012 (0.00011) 0.00014 (0.00011) 0.00017 (0.00011)
k=6 0.00002 (0.00017) 0.00008 (0.00018) 0.00035 (0.00017) 0.00020 (0.00012)
k=12 0.00002 (0.00018) 0.00008 (0.00019) 0.00037 (0.00018) 0.00020 (0.00013)
Panel B: 24-month reference period
Impulse Response for DSENT1
k=1 -0.00718 (0.04629) 0.07087 (0.04624) 0.03068 (0.03643) 0.02286 (0.04619)
k=6 -0.00969 (0.00783) -0.00305 (0.00669) 0.00248 (0.00297) 0.00014 (0.00080)
k=12 -0.00175 (0.00159) -0.00037 (0.00086) 0.00014 (0.00020) -0.00001 (0.00027)
Impulse Response for REALLOAN
k=1 0.00017 (0.00011) 0.00013 (0.00011) 0.00003 (0.00010) 0.00032 (0.00011)
k=6 0.00011 (0.00019) 0.00009 (0.00019) 0.00009 (0.00018) 0.00038 (0.00013)
k=12 0.00010 (0.00023) 0.00008 (0.00022) 0.00010 (0.00019) 0.00040 (0.00014)
Panel C: 60-month reference period
Impulse Response for DSENT1
k=1 -0.02476 (0.02344) 0.00608 (0.04595) 0.00997 (0.02964) 0.07863 (0.04503)
k=6 -0.01091 (0.00995) -0.00619 (0.01102) 0.00248 (0.00734) 0.00241 (0.00228)
k=12 -0.00468 (0.00425) -0.00294 (0.00524) 0.00053 (0.00159) 0.00003 (0.00006)
Impulse Response for REALLOAN
k=1 -0.00006 (0.00009) 0.00007 (0.00011) 0.00002 (0.00009) 0.00002 (0.00011)
k=6 -0.00025 (0.00019) -0.00011 (0.00018) 0.00007 (0.00020) -0.00005 (0.00014)
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k=12 -0.00036 (0.00026) -0.00024 (0.00026) 0.00009 (0.00024) -0.00005 (0.00014)
Panel D: 120-month reference period
Impulse Response for DSENT1
k=1 -0.03066 (0.02124) 0.00413 (0.01622) -0.00825 (0.04619) 0.00757 (0.04618)
k=6 -0.01547 (0.01019) 0.00282 (0.01044) 0.00090 (0.01067) -0.00376 (0.00486)
k=12 -0.00774 (0.00513) 0.00200 (0.00710) 0.00037 (0.00446) -0.00035 (0.00056)
Impulse Response for REALLOAN
k=1 -0.00007 (0.00009) 0.00002 (0.00008) 0.00002 (0.00011) 0.00018 (0.00011)
k=6 -0.00034 (0.00018) 0.00012 (0.00016) 0.00013 (0.00018) 0.00036 (0.00018)
k=12 -0.00052 (0.00026) 0.00021 (0.00026) 0.00019 (0.00026) 0.00041 (0.00021)
The table shows the results of VAR estimation, where the impulse responses are for our pt(ω) series, from
January 1967 to December 2005. DSENT1 is the investor sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007).
REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to total consumer loans in the US. Standard errors are in parentheses.
51
Table 7: k-Period Impulse Responses: Liquidity and Securitization
Panel A: 12-month reference period
1-σ 2-σ 3-σ
Impulse Response for LIQ
k=1 -0.00070 (0.00374) 0.00384 (0.00367) -0.00057 (0.00359)
k=6 0.00013 (0.00204) -0.00088 (0.00179) 0.00088 (0.00206)
k=12 0.00002 (0.00020) 0.00008 (0.00034) -0.00006 (0.00037)
Impulse Response for SECPCT
k=1 0.00021 (0.00149) -0.00015 (0.00145) 0.00051 (0.00143)
k=6 0.00016 (0.00074) 0.00152 (0.00069) 0.00130 (0.00077)
k=12 0.00003 (0.00016) 0.00013 (0.00022) 0.00002 (0.00024)
Panel B: 24-month reference period
Impulse Response for LIQ
k=1 0.00460 (0.00365) 0.00433 (0.00366) NA
k=6 0.00040 (0.00164) -0.00077 (0.00164)
k=12 0.00007 (0.00041) -0.00007 (0.00029)
Impulse Response for SECPCT
k=1 -0.00028 (0.00148) -0.00175 (0.00143)
k=6 0.00035 (0.00067) 0.00149 (0.00069)
k=12 0.00009 (0.00018) 0.00018 (0.00024)
Panel C: 60-month reference period
Impulse Response for LIQ
k=1 0.00203 (0.00361) 0.00701 (0.00368) NA
k=6 -0.00031 (0.00185) 0.00010 (0.00161)
k=12 0.00100 (0.00130) -0.00001 (0.00098)
Impulse Response for SECPCT
k=1 0.00069 (0.00148) -0.00012 (0.00150)
k=6 0.00117 (0.00090) 0.00043 (0.00065)
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k=12 0.00130 (0.00077) 0.00030 (0.00041)
Panel D: 120-month reference period
Impulse Response for LIQ
k=1 NA 0.00104 (0.00364) -0.00040 (0.00360)
k=6 -0.00128 (0.00113) -0.00089 (0.00232)
k=12 -0.00106 (0.00096) -0.00157 (0.00130)
Impulse Response for SECPCT
k=1 0.00249 (0.00144) 0.00190 (0.00143)
k=6 0.00128 ( 0.00043) -0.00045 (0.00091)
k=12 0.00102 (0.00038) -0.00017 (0.00050)
The table shows the results of VAR estimation where the impulse responses are for our pt(ω) series, from
January 1989 to December 2006. LIQ is the liquidity measure of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). SECPCT
is the percentage change in the value of securitized loans in the US. NA denotes a model where estimation
did not converge. Standard errors are in parentheses.53
Table 8: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 12-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 5.3675 4.5980 -21.5218 0.1487 -2.3985 -5.7905 -1.5121 26.0566 9.5101
(0.0011) (0.0047) (0.0052) (0.2759) (0.6978) (0.0179) (0.4771) (0.0197) (0.3332)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0186
Score 0.0175
Wald 0.0409
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 8.6457 7.9444 -45.0513 -0.0339 -9.3293 -8.0929 -2.9394 39.1506 15.3235
(0.0112) (0.0195) (0.0091) (0.8263) (0.1551) (0.0443) (0.4729) (0.0472) (0.4558)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0011
Score 0.0094
Wald 0.0275
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient 8.7419 7.6638 -57.7413 0.2965 -9.3413 -15.1531 -6.2688 68.5561 34.5645
(0.3130) (0.3765) (0.2006) (0.4033) (0.4732) (0.1723) (0.5143) (0.2016) (0.4852)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.3148
Score 0.4609
Wald 0.5756
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pt(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT1 is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. A chi square statistic is
computed as the squared ratio of each parameter to its standard error, and the corresponding p-values are in parentheses.
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Table 9: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 24-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 8.0943 7.6624 -32.8161 0.0229 0.2950 -2.7495 -1.8432 11.9173 11.2734
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0003) (0.8768) (0.9685) (0.3271) (0.4599) (0.3483) (0.3182)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald <.0001
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 1.9688 1.6283 -15.3030 -0.0169 7.4385 1.5592 -0.1817 -5.0872 1.3811
(0.3934) (0.4802) (0.1751) (0.9135) (0.2383) (0.6483) (0.9515) (0.7540) (0.9245)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0851
Score 0.1339
Wald 0.1613
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient -1.4408 -2.3552 -6.4250 0.1366 2.2496 -0.6735 0.3425 4.2006 -2.9245
(0.6920) (0.5189) (0.7127) (0.6338) (0.8520) (0.8974) (0.9489) (0.8624) (0.9094)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.9911
Score 0.9930
Wald 0.9943
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pt(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT1 is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. P-values based on chi-
square tests are in parentheses.
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Table 10: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 60-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 16.9786 16.5095 -70.4190 0.1522 -10.5182 -1.8429 2.0033 10.0758 -6.1854
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.4344) (0.3580) (0.7002) (0.6823) (0.6377) (0.7765)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald <.0001
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 2.9659 2.7202 -18.6782 -0.0187 -0.8247 2.2365 1.8791 -10.9524 -7.0953
(0.1951) (0.2345) (0.0962) (0.9068) (0.8959) (0.5649) (0.5405) (0.5557) (0.6379)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.0032
Score 0.0099
Wald 0.0326
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient 0.4406 0.00661 -16.0284 0.1180 -6.6053 8.8289 2.9406 -41.4283 -12.1881
(0.9290) (0.9989) (0.5133) (0.7092) (0.5846) (0.3623) (0.6712) (0.3911) (0.7251)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.4572
Score 0.6365
Wald 0.7028
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pt(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT1 is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. P-values based on chi-
square tests are in parentheses.
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Table 11: Cumulative Logistic Estimation, 120-month Reference Period
Panel A: 1-σ events
Intercept1 Intercept2 REALLOAN DSENT1 SECPCT LIQ0 LIQ1 REALLOAN*LIQ0 REALLOAN*LIQ1
Coefficient 88.9107 NA -349.3 -0.2846 -86.9502 189.6 79.0265 -834.0 -352.6
(0.4142) NA (0.4126) (0.9322) (0.8750) (0.5211) (0.6861) (0.5032) (0.6674)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald 0.8770
Panel B: 2-σ events
Coefficient 4.0076 3.9309 -21.7267 0.0876 17.3339 6.0011 3.4082 -25.7645 -17.0596
(0.0612) (0.0662) (0.0367) (0.5570) (0.0204) (0.1275) (0.3536) (0.1638) (0.3492)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR <.0001
Score <.0001
Wald <.0001
Panel C: 3-σ events
Coefficient 0.0380 -0.2100 -9.2003 0.0761 0.0676 7.7500 3.1538 -37.1530 -15.2701
(0.9885) (0.9367) (0.4716) (0.7288) (0.9933) (0.1886) (0.4639) (0.1975) (0.4732)
Tests of Overall Fit (p-values): LR 0.2074
Score 0.4223
Wald 0.5305
The table shows the results of logistic regression estimation, from January 1989 to December 2005. The dependent, categorical variable
is pt(ω), which is ranked as Low (less than 0.33), Medium (between 0.33 and 0.67), and High (above 0.67). DSENT is the investor
sentiment measure of Baker and Wurgler (2007). LIQ0 and LIQ1 correspond to low and medium levels of liquidity, SECPCT is the
percentage change in securitized loans, REALLOAN is the ratio of real estate loans to other consumer loans. P-values based on chi-
square tests are in parentheses.
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